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RESPONSE TO MACHAN'S FACTS
Gary Machan gave UNUM good reason not to trust him shortly after he filed
a claim for disability benefits stemming from heart bypass surgery in the spring of
1999. Machan had filed a claim form with UNUM two weeks before his heart
surgery claiming that he was going to miss six months of work, but following the
surgery his cardiologist informed UNUM that a normal recovery period would be
8-12 weeks and that Machan was fit to return to work after three months. When
his own cardiologist would not support his claim for six months of disability
benefits, Machan tried a different approach. In a telephone call with UNUM,
Machan asserted that he was a construction worker, that the arterial graft taken
from his arm during his heart surgery was causing a nerve problem in his left hand,
that he was unable to operate heavy equipment or operate a nail gun, and that he
was, therefore, unable to return to work. Of course, this was surprising to UNUM
which was under the impression that Machan was a successful real estate
developer, not a construction worker. Machan followed up with a letter to UNUM
asserting that his neurologist had recommended a 6 to 12 month recovery period
for his hand. Memorandum Supporting Motion For Summary Judgment, U.S.
District Court Docket No. 126, at pp. ii-xvii.

UNUM investigated Machan's additional claim based on the alleged
complications with his left hand. Among other things, UNUM sought medical
records from Machan's treating physicians, including Dr. Mackie, Machan's
cardiologist, and Dr. Black, a neurologist to whom Dr. Mackie sent Machan for
follow-up with his alleged left-hand complaint. UNUM also had its in-house
physician, Dr. Reeder, contact both Dr. Mackie and Dr. Black and review
additional follow-up information they had provided. Id.
Dr. Mackie confided to Dr. Reeder that Machan had indicated to him a
desire to maintain his "disability" status for as long as he could. In
communications between Dr. Reeder and Dr. Black, Dr. Black indicated that
Machan did not suffer weakness in his left hand, but rather a "mild pure sensory
loss." Dr. Black determined that any indication of left hand weakness resulted
from Machan not giving adequate effort in the tests that Dr. Black performed to
measure grip strength. Id.
Based on its further investigation, UNUM again offered Machan benefits
that were consistent with Machan's 12-week recovery period for bypass surgery.
UNUM denied additional continued benefits for Machan's alleged hand problems
based on, among other things, the information obtained from Drs. Mackie and
Black. Id.

Machan eventually accepted the benefits then threatened to sue UNUM.
UNUM treated the threat as an appeal of the denial of continued benefits and
conducted a further review. The denial was upheld and by December 1, 1999,
Machan had no further communications with UNUM regarding his cardiac/hand
claim and his file was removed from UNUM's active claim files. Not surprisingly,
Machan claims no bad faith for UNUM's actions regarding his cardiac/hand claim.
Id
The next spring, unsuccessful in his attempts to get 6-12 months of disability
benefits for his heart and hand, Machan filed yet another claim with UNUM, this
time claiming "Emotional breakdown". Although Machan asserted that his date of
disability was the date of his bypass surgery, Machan had never before mentioned
his supposed emotional impairment. UNUM responded to Machan's new claim by
seeking the customary narratives from Machan's psychiatrist and psychologist.
When Machan's health care providers eventually provided some information,
UNUM's consulting psychiatrist found the physician statements to be illegible,
inconsistent and contradictory. UNUM's consulting psychiatrist tried at least five
times to set up telephone conferences with Machan's psychiatrist and psychologist,
all to no avail. Before contact could be made and information obtained, Machan

filed this lawsuit and withdrew his consent to release of medical information. Id.
at pp xvii-xxvi.
One of Machan's close business associates has since testified that Machan is
not disabled, that he has been dishonest in his representations to UNUM, and that
Machan has intended all along to collect benefits to which he is not entitled under
the policy. Id.
In the U.S. District Court, Machan claimed he had proof to back up a bad
faith corporate pattern and practice theory that had worked so well for his lawyer
in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.1 A component of this
theory is that insurance companies like UNUM set reserves (as required by law)
for each insurance claim, which provides afinancialincentive to deny otherwise
valid claims. Of course, the beauty of the "pattern & practice" theory is that it
works for virtually any insurance company. Machan ultimately never came up
with any proof for his theory from any of the documents or witnesses related to his
disability claims. More importantly, Machan was never able to link the denial of
his own claims with any supposed bad corporate practices at UNUM. In fact,
UNUM's former Vice-President, Mary Fuller, who held supervisory authority over
the claims person who handled Machan's claims, testified in another lawsuit in

1

2001 Ut 89, 65 P.3d 1134, rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).

California that she never denied a legitimate claim when she was at UNUM. Reply
Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. District Court
Docket No. 141, at p. 19-20.
Machan inundated the federal court with pages and pages of documents that
he claims are evidence of UNUM's corporate scheme to deny valid claims. These
documents outline legitimate corporate goals, compensation structures and
employee benefits. These are the same documents Machan refers to at pages 7
through 9 of his opening brief in reference to what he calls UNUM's "reserve
reduction goals", "expectations" and "targets". Many of these documents were not
produced in this case or in any other case in Utah involving UNUM, and Machan
simply filed them with the federal court without any authentication. All of these
documents appear to be the type of corporate documents that another litigant in
federal court who was also represented by Machan's counsel unsuccessfully sought
from UNUM in a companion case to the present case. Magistrate Judge Boyce
reviewed many of the same kind of documents in camera in the companion case
and ruled that the plaintiff was trying to read something into the documents that
could only be seen through a distorted lens:
[T]he basis of plaintiffs motion is that the documents
could contain information as to possible directions,
pressures and incentives on the part of UNUM, as to its
policies and practices, directed to its personnel that

would operate to cause them to deny legitimate claims of
insureds made against their policy rights and to reward
UNUM claims personnel or supervisors for such action.
At hearing on the matter, the Court felt there was doubt
about whether there was any real showing of "good cause"
under Rule 26(b)(1) F.R.C.P. for such production and
whether the requested material is "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Upon review of plaintiffs predicate support materials,
the Court finds the inferences plaintiff seeks to draw
from expressed management and assessment criteria is
slim to non-existent... After review of the materials the
Court concludes there is nothing in the documents that meets
the criteria for production under Rule 26(b)(1), F.R.C.P....
(emphasis added).
Reply Memorandum at p. 22.
As Machan points out, the U.S. District Court was unpersuaded by
Machan's corporate policy & practice nonsense and was disposed to grant
UNUM's Motion for Summary Judgment, except perhaps the breach of contract
claim (which relies on an answer to the first certified question) and the claim under
the Claims Practices Act (which relies on an answer to the second certified
question), and has merely dismissed UNUM's motion for administrative purposes
pending a response from this Court to the certified issues.

ARGUMENT
I
ABSENT BAD FAITH, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARE NOT
RECOVERABLE IN A FIRST PARTY INSURANCE CONTEXT FOR
FAILURE TO PAY POLICY BENEFITS
The Court obviously assumed in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), with good reason, that prior to its decision an insured in
Utah had no right to an award of consequential damages against an insurer in a first
party situation for failure to pay policy benefits. The law in Utah at that time, and
still, is that the exclusive measure of damages for detention of money is interest.
J.B. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d
538, 542 (1973); Reed v. Armstrong, 6 Utah 2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 (1957). Indeed,
the plaintiff in Beck sought only the amount of policy limits as damages for breach
of the express policy provisions. Beck at 797.
This same exclusive measure of damages in other states is what spawned the
tort theory for insurance bad faith that Beck found was theoretically unsound. See,
eg., Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First
Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 164 (Oct.
1976). As Beck noted, "The pragmatic reason for adopting the tort approach is that
it exposes insurers to consequential and punitive damages awards in excess of the

policy limits." Beck at 800. For instance, in Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance
Company, 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980), the Rhode Island Supreme Court made the
following observation as it held that a violation of an insurer's obligation to act in
good faith gives rise to an independent claim in tort:
The California courts and those jurisdictions that have
chosen to adopt this [tort] theory of recovery recognize the
problems inherent in an insured's claim based solely on
contract. Traditionally, recovery in contract for breach of a
unilateral or independent obligation to pay a certain sum of
money is confined to the actual amount owed under the
contract plus legal interest.
417A.2dat318.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, like the Utah Supreme Court in Beck,
addressed only whether a remedy beyond policy limits exists for breach of the
insurer's duty to act in good faith in its relationship with its policyholders. As the
Utah Supreme Court subsequently noted in Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance
Company, 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996): "Beck did not deal with a breach of the
underlying insurance contract's express provisions, but only with a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing". 918 P.2d at 466. Presumably,
Hanover Insurance Company left unaltered in Rhode Island, as did Beck in Utah,
the law with respect to the measure of damages that may be awarded for breach of
an insurance contract in the absence of bad faith.

In a footnote in the Beck decision the Court disavowed dicta in Ammerman
v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261,430 P.2d 567, 578 (1967), that
in an action for breach of an insurance policy, the damages could not exceed the
policy limits. Beck at 801, m. 5. In fact, Ammerman was a bad faith case that in
dicta correctly stated the law with respect to an action for breach of the express
terms of an insurance policy. We suggest that the disavowal of the Ammerman
dicta in Beck was necessary in order to reach under contract principles what Beck
termed "the principal reason for the adoption of the tort approach - to provide
damage exposure in excess of the policy limits and thus remove any incentive for
breaching the duty of good faith." Beck at 801. This reading of footnote 5 in Beck
is supported by the court's later explanation in Billings that in Beck, "We
recognized that in appropriate circumstances, 'consequential damages for breach of
contract may reach beyond the bare contract terms,' (citations omitted) and
therefore, that the monetary limits of an insurance policy do not invariably define
the amount for which the insurer may be liable upon a breach." (underline added).
Billings at 466.
While Machan suggests that every contract breach is subject to
consequential damages, Billings says that in the insurance arena this is so only in
appropriate circumstances (i.e., bad faith). This is certainly not inconsistent with

the rule in Utah that the exclusive measure of damages for detention of money is
interest. J.B. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, supra.
Machan refers to the only reported Utah decision, other than Billings, where
an insured sought consequential damages above policy limits, other than attorney's
fees, without specifically alleging bad faith, i.e., Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co.,
939 P. 2d 1204,1211 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied 945 P.2d 1118 (1997). We
addressed Castillo in UNUM's opening brief in footnote 6 by stating that the
insureds sought consequential damages for the lost use of their automobile when
their insurer failed to promptly pay uninsured motorist coverage. Although the
insureds failed the second required prong for an award of consequential damages
(i.e., damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty), the Court of
Appeals suggested that consequential damages would otherwise have been
recoverable. An obligation to promptly and reasonably bargain and settle a claim
is precisely the duty of good faith that Beck says is inherent in all insurance
contracts. Thus, it appears that the insurer's breach in Castillo amounted to a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, not a breach of the express terms of
the insurance policy, even though bad faith was apparently not pleaded.
Machan also cites a third party insurance case, Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Company v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d

906 (1958), which involved a performance bond whereby the bond company
agreed to indemnify the title company against mechanics liens if the general
contractor failed to pay its subcontractors. The title company eventually had to
defend title against a number of mechanic's lien claimants and incurred attorney's
fees in those actions. It sought the attorney's fees it had incurred in the mechanic's
lien actions in a breach of contract action against the bond company and was
awarded the attorney's fees as consequential damages. The Court specifically
acknowledged that if the title company had sought the attorney's fees it had
incurred in its breach of contract case against the bond company, the fees would
not have been recoverable because there was no attorney's fees provision in the
performance bond. Although the performance bond undoubtedly had a penal sum
which measured the bond company's maximum exposure, the bond company's
obligation under the performance bond was to indemnify the title company and
hold it harmless from the general contractor's defaults. Therefore, the bond
company's failure was more than simply the detention of money. Thus, the award
of consequential damages for breach of contract in Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Company does not offend the principle that the exclusive measure of damages for
detention of money is interest. J.B. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation
Corporation, supra.

We remind the Court again of its statement in Campbell v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra:
|T|he rationale behind allowing recovery of both general
and consequential damages in first-party, bad faith
actions is "to remove any incentive for insurers to breach
the duty of good faith by expanding their exposure to
damages caused by such a breach beyond the predictable
fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by the policy."
Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. Consequential damages in
first-party bad faith actions can be awarded for such
things as attorney fees, loss of a home or business,
damages flowing from bankruptcy, and mental anguish,
provided such damages are foreseeable. Id. at 468; Beck,
701 P.2d at 802. (bold and underline added).
Campbell, 2001 Ut 89, \ 120.
Beck and Billings both defined consequential damages in the traditional
sense, i.e., consequential damages are those reasonably within the contemplation
of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made.
See, Beck at 801; Billings at 466; see also, Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 Ut 104, \ 20,
990 P.2d 933 (holding that to recover consequential damages, a non-breaching
party must prove (1) that consequential damages were caused by the contract
breach; (2) that consequential damages ought to be allowed because they were
foreseeable at the time the parties contracted; and, (3) the amount of consequential
damages within a reasonable certainty). Billings then refused in the insurance
context to allow recovery of what it referred to as "broad consequential damages"

for breach of the express policy provisions. Obviously, whether the insurer
breaches the express policy provisions, or the implied covenant of good faith, the
ultimate failure on the part of the insurer is the same - the insurance proceeds are
not paid to the insured, and the consequential losses that stem from a failure to pay
the policy proceeds, that are foreseeable at the time the contract was made, are
going to be the same.
Because all consequential damages arising from breach of contract must
meet the same test of foreseeability at the time the contract is made, it is
inconceivable that there would be "narrow" consequential damages for breach of
the express provisions of the policy, and "broad" consequential damages for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as Machan asserts.
By disallowing recovery for the consequential losses claimed in Billings for
a breach of the express policy provisions, Billings confirmed the rule that only the
policy proceeds plus interest can be recovered by an insured when an insurer
disputes a fairly debatable claim. As Billlings tells us:
[I]t would not further Beck's purpose of encouraging
insurers to act reasonably if we were to impose the broad
consequential damages allowed in Beck upon every insurer
who is ultimately determined by the court to have
incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable
the denial. Such an insurer ought to incur no greater damage
exposure than any other person breaching the express terms
of a contract. Indeed, it would be unfair not to permit an

insurer who has a legitimate dispute with an insured over a
claim to have the dispute resolved before having to pay the
claim. Exposure to the sweeping measure of damages
available for breach of the implied covenant would
effectively deny any careful insurer the option of declining
to pay a contested claim and awaiting the outcome of the
dispute.
Billings at 466-467.
In its Order of Certification the U.S. District Court asks whether an insured
may recover consequential damages for breach of the express terms of an
insurance contract, and if so, how are these consequential damages distinguished
from the consequential damages that Beck tells us are available for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith. While we offer no advice because Beck, we
believe, did not alter existing law that for breach of the express terms the exclusive
measure of damages is the policy coverage plus interest, we point out that Machan
has never suggested why the consequential losses he claims should be recoverable
if all he can prove is breach of contract, not bad faith. Billings was very clear that
the "broad" consequential damages suggested in Beck are not available unless the
insured can prove bad faith. Machan's supposed consequential losses fit neatly
within those enumerated in Beck.2

2

Machan asserted that, in addition to his attorney's fees, he suffered consequential
damages from the following losses: (1) worsening of his psychological condition; (2)
inability to afford psychological treatment for himself and his mentally ill son; (3)

Finally, we need to correct a misstatement in UNUM's opening brief. On
page 20 of the opening brief it states: "A year after Billings, in Gibbs M. Smith,
Inc., v. U.S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997), the Court, without any mention of
Billings, overturned the district court's award of attorney's fees for breach of an
insurance contract in a first party situation and remanded for a determination as to
whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing had been breached and
for an award of attorneys fees accordingly." (underline added). In fact, the Gibbs
M. Smith case did mention Billings, but only for the proposition that attorney's fees
can be recovered for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
without any mention that attorney's fees may be recovered for breach of the policy
terms, which is precisely the point we sought to make.
II
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 31A-26301(2000) INDICATES THAT IT DOES NOT CONFER A PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION
Machan tells us about the changes to section 31 A-26-301(3) that were first
introduced during the 2001 legislative session and became law in 2002. Of course,

depletion of his assets and savings in order to meet basic living expenses; and (4) the
inability to have any significant gainful employment due to his worsened psychological
condition. Plaintiffs Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment, U.S. District Court
Docket No. 135, at p. 11.

the U.S. District Court wants to know if section 31A-26-301 conferred a private
cause of action in 2000, not 2002. The 2001 legislative debate recited in Machan's
opening brief merely suggests that Senator Valentine mistakenly interpreted
section 31A-26-3 01 (2000) to confer a private right of action. With all due respect
to Senator Valentine, his personal interpretation of an existing statute is not
helpful.
The Court does not need to examine the legislative history of section 31A26-301 to discover the legislative intent. "When examining a statute, we look first
to its plain language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in
passing the statute." Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416,418 (Utah
1998). "Legislators may decide that a statute should be passed for myriad, often
even different, reasons, but where the legislative purpose is expressly stated and
agreed to as part of the legislation, we do not look to the views expressed by one or
more legislators in floor debates, committee minutes, or elsewhere, in determining
the intent of the statute." Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 Ut
134,1[19, 67 P.3d 436.
The legislature expressly set forth its intent and purpose for Chapter 26 of
Title 31 A. The purpose of the statute in effect in 2000, as stated in Section 31A-26101 (1992), is clear and unambiguous:

The purposes of this chapter are:
(1) to promote the professional competence of
those engaged in claims adjusting;
(2) to encourage fair and rapid settlement of
claims;
(3) to protect claimants under insurance policies
from unfair claims adjustment practices; and
(4) to prevent compensation arrangements for
insurance adjusters that endanger the fairness of claim
settlements.
Machan further asserts that because the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303(5), expressly states "This section does not
create any private cause of action", that Section 31A-26-301 must, therefore, imply
a private right of action by its absence of such language. There was, however,
good reason for the legislature's express disavowal of a private cause of action in
Section 3 lA-26-303(5).
When the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act was enacted in the 1985
Utah legislative session, Section 31A-26-303(5) read: "This section does not create
nor destroy any private cause of action". One year later the words "nor destroy"
were deleted so that the statute reads: "This section does not create any private
cause of action". Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 204,
§ 218. The need to affirm that the statute was not intended to confer a private right
of action is undoubtedly explained by a California decision, Moradi-Shalal v.

Fireman's Fund Ins., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988). In that case the California Supreme
Court overruled Globe Insurance Co., v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880,153 Cal.
Rptr., 592 P.2d 329 (1979), which had held that the California Unfair Practices Act
created a private cause of action against insurers who commit the unfair practices
enumerated in that provision. The California Unfair Practices Act, like Utah's
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303, was
derived from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Unfair
Claims Practices Act (MUCPA), which was adopted by 48 states. By 1988, the
courts in 19 states other than California had faced the issue whether their versions
of the model act created a private cause of action. The courts in 17 of these 19
states had refused to recognize such a cause of action. As the court pointed out in
Moradi-Shalal, "The Model Act was not intended to create a private action.... The
great majority of state versions of the Model Act have been held not to create a
private cause of action. " Id. at 64 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Obviously, in view of Globe Insurance, and the litigation in 19 states other
than California, the Utah legislature clarified that in Utah the Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act does not confer a private right of action. This in no wise
suggests that by its absence of language similar to section 31 A-26-303(5) that
section 31A-26-3 01 was intended to confer a private cause of action.

In UNUM's opening brief, we anticipated Machan's argument that
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) supports the proposition that a court
may imply a private cause of action when a statute is silent on the issue. In
Spackman v. Board of Education ofBox Elder County School Dist. 2000 Ut 87, 16
P.3d 533, the Court addressed two issues: (1) whether the Free and Equal Public
Education Clause of the Utah Constitution (Art. X, § 1) and/or the Due Process
Clause of the Utah Constitution (Art. I, § 7) are self-executing constitutional
provisions that may be directly enforced without implementing legislation; (2) if
so, whether they may be enforced through a private suit for damages. After
answering that both constitutional provisions are self-executing, the Court held that
a Utah court's ability to award damages for violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision rests on the common law. The Court found that
Restatement section 8 74A supports this view that under common law when no
specific remedy is mentioned, a court may accord an appropriate remedy to one
injured from the violation of a constitutional violation. Spackman at flf 19-21.
Obviously, this analysis is irrelevant to the present issue certified by the U.S.
District Court, which wants to know whether Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301
conferred a private right of action in 2000. Nothing in Spackman suggests that the
Court intended to adopt section 874A to overrule years of Utah jurisprudence

which refuses to imply a private cause of action based upon state law, absent some
specific direction from the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Again, the U.S. District Court should be advised that with respect to the first
question certified, that the answer is "no". In a first party insurance situation an
insured may not recover consequential damages, other than attorney's fees, for
breach of the express terms of an insurance contract. We further suggest that the
U.S. District Court should be advised that Utah law no longer allows an award of
attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the express terms of an
insurance policy.
With respect to the second question certified, the U.S. District court should
again be advised that the answer is "no". Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-301, entitled
"Timely Payment of Claims" did not allow a private cause of action by the insured
against his or her insurer for violation of the statute in 2000.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2004.
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